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Abstract 
 
This article provides a conversation analytic description of a two-part structure ‘I don’t 
want X, I want/just want Y’. Drawing on a corpus of recordings of family mealtimes and 
television documentary data I show how speakers use the structure in two recurrent 
environments. First, speakers may use the structure to reject a proposal regarding 
their actions made by an interlocutor. Second, speakers may deliver the structure 
following a co-interactant’s formulation of their actions or motivations. Both uses 
decrease the likelihood of challenge in third-turn position. When responding to multi-
unit turns speakers routinely deal with the last item first. The value of I want Y is to 
formulate an alternative sense of agency which undermines the preceding turn and 
shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. The article contributes to work in 
discursive psychology as I show how speakers may formulate their ‘wants’ in the 
service of sequentially unfolding social interaction. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper examines a two-part structure ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ which speakers 
may use to reject a proposal regarding their future actions or to refute a formulation 
of their motivations. The aim is to demonstrate how speakers may formulate mental 
states, motivations and intentions in the service of sequentially unfolding social 
interaction. Studying the recurrent ways speakers construct their intentions in 
interaction permits the empirical investigation of how a range of mental states are 
invoked in the service of social action and practices of accountability. 
 
Let us start with a brief example of the phenomena under consideration. The topic 
of talk between Jane and her teenage daughter Emily is a jumper belonging to 
Jane that has gone missing, which Emily has allegedly been seen wearing. Prior 
to the beginning of the extract Emily has repeatedly denied this. 
 
Extract 1 2008E6 12:48 
 
 
01 Emi: it’s not your jumpe:r 
02  (1.0) 
03 Jan: cause my jumper’s gone 
04  missing and you::’re seen wearing one that 
05  looks exactly like my jumper 
06 Sim: ((putting papers away in the dining room)) 
07 (1) Sim: you’re not starting a fi:ght now are you Jane 
08 Jan: ((walks into dining room towards Simon)) 
09 (2a) Jan: I’m not tryna’ start a fi:ght 
10 (2b) I just want my clo:thes ba:ck. 
 
 
11 Sim:   what’s happened no:w 
 
 
There is something more than a simple denial here. After denying the accusation 
that she is ‘tryna’ start a fi:ght’ Jane proceeds to reformulate her actions 
as directed at ‘just’ getting her clothes back (‘I just want my clo:thes ba:ck.’). 
This formulation of her wants is constructed as the motivating force behind her 
actions. According to the communication view ‘communication is supposed to be 
intentional, i.e. activated by the speakers’ reasoning about its own beliefs, desires 
and intentions’ (Dragoni et al., 2002: 120). That is, Jane experiences a desire to 
obtain her clothes, believes that Emily has her clothes and thus intends to retrieve 
them from Emily. However that is not what is happening here. Rather, the 
formulation of ‘wanting’ arises as it is used to counter the notion that Jane may be 
motivated to do some other thing (to ‘start a fi:ght’’). Rather than a simple 
‘didn’t do it’ denial which is susceptible to further challenge (Dersley & Wootton, 
2000), Jane formulates an alternative sense of agency and by doing so she is 
realizing a particular rhetorical effect. To uncover what this effect is it is necessary 
to turn to those who treat displays of mental states within talk as ‘genuine 
references to psychological states’ (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995: 31) and who 
subscribe to the notion of desires, beliefs and intentions explanatory variables in 
human actions. In this literature the creation of a contrast between action and 
intention is understood as a cognitive accomplishment (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995; Shatz et al., 1983). Here it is examined as a piece of interactional business. 
 
1.1 Motivation, Intention and action 
The notion that intentional and mental states are a priori cognitive processes which 
are communicated through language is prevalent in contemporary psychology. 
Mental states and emotions are understood as discrete, individual entities which 
other individuals must learn how to ‘read’ and understand. How individuals learn to 
bridge the gap between their own and others’ minds is formulated as an almost 
impossible problem. This problem is most commonly studied under the rubric of 
Theory of Mind, a large body of work which has examined how young children 
develop the capacity to ‘read minds’ and to understand the mental lives of others 
(see Wellman, 2010 for a recent review). This work is grounded in a referential 
view of language which assumes that mental state terms develop in vocabulary as 
names referring to inner experiences. How children learn to use mental state terms 
which ‘describe internal, unobservable mental states’ and ‘therefore pose a 
referential challenge for the young word-learner’ (Slaughter, et al., 2009: 1058) 
also becomes a problem. Intentions are understood to be instrumental in 
constructing explanations of others’ behaviour as we engage in theorising in order 
to make sense of one another; ‘cognizing about the mind is a ubiquitous human 
activity; we consistently construe each other as agents undertaking intentional 
action based on our underlying beliefs and desires’ (Wellman, 2010: 2). 
 
1.2 Formulating intentions in interaction 
 
 
In the mid twentieth century philosophers in rhetoric began to discuss the notion 
of ‘motives’, or motive-talk (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). In contrast to psychological 
research on intentions and motivations, which propose inner states as causes of 
behaviour, motives were defined as reasons for actions which are cited when 
behaviour is problematic (Mills, 1940). Scott and Lyman (1968) drew on the 
pioneering work on motives in their work on ‘accounts’ which they defined as the 
provision of a justification or excuse for an undesirable or problematic event. 
 
Accountability as a pervasive feature of people’s descriptions was a key feature of 
early discursive psychology. As Edwards (1997: 7) notes, ‘they attend to events in 
terms of what is normal, expectable, and proper; they attend to their own 
responsibility in events and in the reporting of events…. and they invoke notions of 
motive, causation, justification and cognition’. MacMillan and Edwards (1999) 
examined British newspaper coverage of the death of Princess Diana in the weeks 
after the event. They show that in reports the press handled their accountability as 
agents in the events they were reporting as they assembled factual narratives and 
explanations which assigned and avoided blame. Edwards (2006) examined how 
the modal verb would is used in handling accountability by formulating a general 
disposition to act one way or another in the context of police interrogation. He 
shows how suspects invoke intentionality and state what they generally would or 
wouldn’t do as a basis for denying a specific accusation. 
 
A second pertinent body of work is that in conversation analysis which has examined 
the sequential design and organisation of accounts (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Ford, 
2002; Robinson & Bolden, 2010; Sterponi, 2003). These studies have examined the 
practices of soliciting an account as well as types of accounts and their sequential 
design. Relevant to the current paper, Bolden and Robinson (2011) discuss the 
practice of calling for an account from a co-interactant using a ‘why’ formatted 
interrogative (such as why did you do that?). They show how, rather than working as 
an information seeking question, ‘why’ formatted interrogatives index the stance that 
the item to be accounted for is unwarranted or inappropriate. As such, rather than 
orienting to these turns as seeking information, respondents frequently orient to the 
implied challenging stance of the interrogative by either overtly aligning with it or by 
rejecting the challenge and providing an account to justify the reasonableness of 
the accountable item. 
 
These studies comprise an approach to the analysis of accounts and intentions as 
concerns which are displayed by participants in a sequential flow of ongoing 
actions. This paper extends this work and focuses on formulations of ‘wants’ in 
particular kinds of sequential environments, doing particular kinds of actions as a 
practical feature of accountability. 
 
An examination of how speakers formulate notions of ‘wanting’, where these 
constructions are deployed and to what end is of relevance to academic psychology 
and ordinary individuals alike as formulating one’s own and others’ ‘wants’ is a 
common activity in conversation. Consider the following live examples; 
 
Extract 2 Potts 12 06:30 
 
 
01 Jud: half chewed  
02 Jud: ((shows pizza box to Don)) 
03  (0.4)  
04 Don: I don’t want half chewed pizza¿ 
 
Extract 3 AAFE3 26:58 
 
 
01 Pat:   oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be 
02 ba:ck here by six. 
In extract two Don refuses an offer of ‘half chewed pizza¿’ by stating that he 
doesn’t want any. In example 3 Pat tells Kevin and Grant to be ‘ba:ck here by 
 
six.’ using an ‘I want’ construction. Extended analysis of the use of ‘I don’t want X’ 
to build refusals and ‘I want you to X’ to deliver directives is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However we can note that speakers routinely deploy notions of ‘wanting’ to 
perform a range of conversational activities. Considering formulations of ‘wants’ as 
resources in and for interaction takes away from the need to theorise about individual 
processes which allow individuals to read the minds of others and to consider instead 
what it means to ‘want’ something as a human action in interaction. 
 
2. Data and method 
 
 
The dataset comprises approximately twenty hours of ‘fly on the wall’ documentary 
programmes which each document the lives of a particular family over an extended 
period of time (the C4 and AAF corpuses) and a corpus of recordings of twelve 
mealtimes made by the ‘Potts’ family (all names are pseudonyms). The family were 
given a video camera for one month and were asked to make recordings of ten to 
fifteen meals. The family were given the option of deleting any recordings before the 
end of the recording period and all participants gave consent for anonymised extracts 
to be used in research meetings and papers. The data were transcribed using the 
Jefferson notation system for conversation analysis. The analytic approach is located 
within the theoretical framework of discursive psychology, which focuses on 
psychology as something displayed in talk in interaction (Potter, 2005). The analysis 
draws on the rigorous analytical techniques of contemporary conversation analysis, 
which examines matters which are fundamental to the situation of people interacting 
with each other, such as robust patterns of interaction and rules which 
speakers orient to. I examined episodes of talk in which speakers use the 
verb ‘want’, the location of this term in ongoing interaction, and the design and 
action orientation of the turns in which the term appeared. 
 
3.0 Analysis 
 
 
The analysis focuses on two versions of the practice, which are as follows; 
 
 
1. In one large group of cases the two-part structure occurs following a turn by speaker 
A that embodies some proposal by speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. These 
proposals may be realised through directives and account solicitations. In each 
instance some proposal is made by speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. The 
device ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ works as a way of rejecting the proposed action by 
formulating a ‘want’ which contrasts with the proposed action.  
 
2. In the second group of cases the device is used by speaker B in response to a 
formulation by speaker A of speaker B’s actions or motivations. In this subset the turn 
is always built using the minimiser ‘just’. The device ‘I don’t want X, I just want Y’  
 
first rejects this formulation and constructs an alternative sense of agency in the 
second turn construction unit (TCU) . Here the device implies that as the speaker is 
motivated to do just a particular thing, they are not motivated to do anything more. 
 
In all cases we shall see that the construction of an intention which motivates 
and drives behaviour is a members’ method which may be deployed in the 
service of sequentially unfolding interaction. 
 
3.1 Rejecting a proposal regarding future actions 
 
 
In this section I show how speakers may use the device ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ to 
reject a proposal regarding their future actions made by an interlocutor. Within my 
materials these proposals are realised through two main turn types. The first of these 
are directives, that is, actions which direct the recipient in some way, to do something 
or to desist in doing something (Craven & Potter, 2010). The second is account 
solicitations (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) which challenge speaker A’s actions and 
make a proposal regarding their future actions. The ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ 
construction is delivered as a way of rejecting the proposal and decreasing the 
likelihood of further challenge in third-turn position. In the first TCU speakers first reject 
the proposal and in the second TCU formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with that 
action. When responding to multi-unit turns, speakers routinely orient to the final part 
of the turn (Schegloff, 2007). The two-part structure then, shifts the trajectory of the 
ongoing sequence and makes relevant a response to the speaker’s formulation of their 
‘wants’. Consider the following example, taken from towards the end of a family meal. 
Prior to the start of the extract there has been disagreement between Wayne and the 
rest of the family regarding the time Wayne will spend ‘playing out’. Indeed this is a 
recurrent theme within the family as Wayne often refuses to finish meals in favour of 
going out to meet friends. Earlier in the meal Judy and Don, Wayne’s parents, stated 
that Wayne will be staying in that night to do his homework. In response Wayne left the 
table without permission to do so and reportedly lay on his bedroom floor ‘in a strop’ 
before being summoned back to the table. 
 
Extract 4 Potts8 19:27 
 
 
01 Jud:  and then we’ll see what tomorrow (.)bri:ngs, 
02 when yer come in (0.2) when yer home from 
03 school and your upstairs get’ cha:nged and 
04 you’ve gone out while I’m putting car awa:y 
05  and you’ve not done your h[ome]work¿  
06 Don:   [[eh ] ] 
07 Don:   [((looks at Jamie))] 
08  (1.4)    
09 Jud: >and then you’ve got us[s-<]  
10 Way:  [ go no:w the::n 
11  (0.2)    
12 (1) Jud: no: e[at your cho]colate [ca:[ke ] 
13 Jam: [(RUSH IT!) ] ch[o:c’late c]ake 
14 (2a) Way:   [don’ ] wa:n i:t 
15  n[o::w]    
 
16 Jam: [ tou]gh  
 
 
17 (2b) Way:   °I wanna meet my m[a::tes°]  
 
 
18 Jud: [ well w]here’s all your 
19  may-you’re not going to pa:rk at this ti:me= 
 
20 Way:   =the:y’re all wa::y’i:n  
 
 
21 Jud:   whe:re they wait*in  
 
 
22 Way:   [((glances at Judy momentarily))]  
 
 
23 Way:   [ cobden stree::t ] 
In her turn at line 1, Judy builds a complaint regarding Wayne’s previous behaviour as 
an account to justify why he will not allowed to leave the house and ‘play out’ with his 
friends on this occasion. The use of the idiomatic expression ‘and then we’ll see 
what tomorrow (.) bri:ngs,’ constructs Wayne’s future actions as scripted 
(Edwards, 1994) and predictable. Wayne cuts into Judy’s turn with ‘ 
 
go no:w the::n’, a request which stands in direct opposition to the line of action 
proposed by Judy. Judy immediately, emphatically rejects this request (‘no:’) and tells 
Wayne to eat his chocolate cake instead. Wayne responds to this directive with the 
target turn. In the first TCU, 2a, he first defies the directive. Research has shown that 
in response to defiance, directors typically deliver a second directive which upgrades 
the director’s entitlement and downgrades the contingencies or considerations 
involved in the recipient compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010) (indeed, Jamie takes a 
turn in overlap with ‘tough’ which deletes Wayne’s turn and challenges his entitlement 
to refuse to comply, although this is not oriented to by her co-interactants). In the 
second TCU, 2b, Wayne formulates an alternative ‘want’ which contrasts with the 
projected action ‘°I wanna meet my m[a::tes°]’. The effect of this is to 
decrease the likelihood of Judy delivering a further, upgraded directive in third-turn 
position. When responding to multi-unit turns respondents typically respond to items in 
reverse order, beginning with the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007). That is, the occurrence 
of a second TCU (‘°I wanna meet my ma::tes°’) 
 
following defiance (‘don’ wa:n i:t’) shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence 
and makes a response to Wayne’s defiance less immediately relevant. Wayne could 
have responded by stating ‘don’ wa:n i:t’ only. However a further, upgraded 
directive (such as eat it) in third-turn position is expectable. Through the deployment of 
‘I want Y’, the topic of conversation is shifted from the matter of the chocolate cake 
to that of Wayne meeting his friends, a third party to whom it emerges he has an 
obligation (‘=the:y’re all wa::y’i:n’). We can note that this topic shift is 
successful as the matter the cake is not pursued in Judy’s subsequent turn, 
rather she enquires as to the whereabouts of Wayne’s friends (line 21) and 
Wayne is subsequently allowed to leave the house after agreeing to eat his 
cake upon his return (data not shown). 
 
In this example then, in contrast to a simple rejecting response Wayne deploys a 
two-part structure which decreases the likelihood of a further upgraded directive 
being delivered in third-turn position. He defies the directive in 2a and proceeds to 
formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected action. Here he invokes his 
friends as a third party to whom he has an obligation to meet. The ‘I want’ 
construction then, undermines the projected course of action and successfully 
shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. 
 
While directives may represent the prototypical action for directing others’ actions 
and making a proposal regarding others’ conduct, there are other resources 
available to speakers for doing so. One of these are why-formatted account 
solicitations (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) which embody a proposal regarding the 
recipient’s actions. Speakers may respond to account solicitations by first rejecting 
the notion that they are motivated to carry out the proposed action and proceeding 
to formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with that action. The following extract in which 
the Potts family are eating a take-away meal from a chip-shop contains a 
prototypical example. 
 
Extract 5 Potts11 08:00 
 
 
01 Don:   [((walks into camera shot and sits down))] 
02 (1) Don: [why don’t you get a portion of chips 
03  betwee:n you instead of throwing- ] 
04 (2a) Jam:     
05 (2b)  I want ri:ce chips and gravy he don’t 
06  like gravy I don’t like plain chips. 
07 Jam: |((puts food into mouth))|  
08  | (0.6) |  
09 Way: I don’t like ri:ce  
10 Don: [((points towards Jamie’s plate)) ] 
11 Don: [well why don’t you get a portion of rice, 
12  a portion of chips, (.) with the >buh- 
13  oh-eh-< gravy, ] 
14   (0.6)  
15 Jud: (can’t) ( ) gravy  
16 Don: |((points towards Wayne’s plate))| 
17  | (0.4) | 
18 Don: split the ri:ce, n-er-n-uh and the chips and 
19  th[en,]   
20 Jam:  [ YE]AH but whose gonna have the other half 
21  of the ri:ce   
In his turn at lines 2-3 Don challenges Jamie and Wayne’s current practice of 
ordering food separately, rather than one portion of chips to share as this would be 
less wasteful (‘instead of throwing-’). As noted by Bolden and Robinson 
(2011) account solicitations are frequently co-implicated in actions such as 
complaining or criticising. As it is Don, Wayne and Jamie’s father, who pays for the 
food, the turn can be heard as complaint implicative. Bolden and Robinson also 
note that ‘why’ formatted account solicitations index a stance that the accountable 
item (in this instance, buying food separately rather than one portion of chips to 
share) is nonsensical. Similarly, Koshik observes that why-formatted interrogatives 
may ‘accomplish challenging/complaining rather than questioning’ (2005: 40) and 
may convey speakers’ stance that ‘no adequate account’ (51) for the problematic 
action is available. This turn then, is built to imply that there is no adequate 
account for the purchasing of separate food and thus that in future Jamie and 
Wayne should order one portion of chips to share. In sum, the turn embodies a 
proposal regarding Jamie and Wayne’s future actions; that they share a portion of 
chips rather than ordering separately. 
 
At lines 4-6 Jamie responds using the two-part structure ‘I don’t’ want X, I want Y’. 
 
The first part of the turn rejects the proposal that Wayne and Jamie share chips in 
 
the future; ‘ ’. Bolden and Robinson (2011) note 
 
that in third position account solicitors may upgrade their challenging stance in a 
variety of ways. Note that chips are part of the meal that Jamie is currently eating and 
so her claim that she doesn’t want chips is open to challenge. In the second part of the 
turn this challenge is headed off as Jamie formulates an alternative ‘want’; ‘I 
 
want chips and gravy,’ a specific meal which is typically served in 
 
one tray from chip-shops in northern England. While chips form part of this meal, this 
is built as contrastive with the course of action prescribed by Don. This contrast is 
further emphasised in the final part of the turn ‘he don’t like gravy I don’t 
 
like plain chips.’. 
 
 
We can note that similarly to extract two, the ‘I want’ format pre-empts and heads 
off a further challenge. Note that the rejection of Don’s proposal is delivered in the 
first TCU, decreasing the likelihood of further challenge in third-turn position. The ‘I 
want’ format displays entitlement to decide what food should be purchased while 
the subsequent accounts display the reasoning behind this. The ‘I want’ format 
then, is built to undermine and reject the proposal that one portion of chips be 
bought in future. 
 
Let us now consider a final example which shows how account solicitors may 
upgrade their challenge in third turn position and how the two-part structure works 
to head off this further challenge. The topic of talk is the date on which the couple, 
Tim and Marian, will get married. Marian has been at pains to persuade Tim to get 
married within the next few months, during the filming of the documentary series in 
which the family are taking part. Immediately preceding the start of the extract Tim 
has stated that he ‘doesn’t fancy getting married just yet’, citing their current living 
circumstances (the couple live with Marian’s parents) and lack of resources to 
decorate a flat a reason for waiting. 
 
Extract 6 1974, 16:59 
 
 
01 Mar: [((looks directly at Tim)) ] 
02 Mar: [s::o, yer gonna make a da:te then] 
 
03 Tim:   ((looks at Marian, shakes head while 
04  speaking)) 
05 Tim: YEAH BUT IT WONT BE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS 
06  THOUGH- TWO OR THREE MONTHS.= 
07 Mar: =*why no::t* 
08 Tim: I DON’T   A:NNA GET MARRIED IN THE 
09  NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS. 
 
10 Mar:   WHY: NO:T  
 
 
11 Tim:   just don’t wa:nt to:.  
 
 
12 Mar:   WHY  
 
 
13 Tim:   °well why shoul[d I]°  
 
 
14 Mar:  [ (j]ust cause she said-) WHY 
15  SHOULDN’T YOU:  
16   (0.2)  
17 Tim: >>well I just do::n’t want to get married in 
18  the next two or three mo:nths.<< 
19 (1) Mar: wh:y not  
20 (2a) Tim: ah don’t know, I just don’t want to 
21 (2b)  I just want to wai:t, and get everything done. 
22  (.) in this time you ca:nt do anything in 
23  [seven weeks ti:me ] 
24 Mar:   [(you- you don’t) kno]w that  
 
 
25 Tim:   I do:: love.  
 
 
26 Mar:   [no you don’t.  ]  
 
 
27 Mar:   [((shakes head))]  
 
 
In the turn at line 2, Marian proposes that Tim will set a date. Note that ‘so’ is 
regularly used by speakers to introduce a formulation of what has been previously 
said. The turn initial ‘so’ then, implies that Tim has already agreed to do so. Tim 
subsequently confirms that a date will be set, but rejects the notion that this will be 
within the next two or three months, during the timeframe which is preferable to 
Marian. Marian proceeds to challenge this timeframe using a ‘why’ formatted 
account solicitation (Bolden & Robinson, 2011); ‘=*why no::t*’. Tim responds 
with a defensive account at lines 8-9, claiming a desire not to do so. This response 
is treated as insufficient as Marian deletes the turn with an exact repeat of her turn 
at line 7, which is produced with raised volume. There is then a series of further 
account solicitations (lines 10 & 12) and rejections (lines 11, 13, 17-18) as Marian 
continues to challenge Tim. In his turn at lines 21-23 Tim delivers the two-part 
structure. In 2a he refutes the notion that he wants to get married in the next few 
months ‘ah don’t know, I just don’t want to’. Notably, throughout the 
sequence Tim’s claim to not want to get married in the next few months (lines 8-9, 
11) have been treated as insufficient. Thus if Tim were to leave it at this it is 
expectable that a further challenge would be forthcoming. In 2b the likelihood of a 
further challenge is decreased as Tim formulates a ‘want’ which contrasts with the 
course of action proposed by Marian; ‘I just want to wai:t, and get 
everything done.’. He adds an incremental (Schegloff, 2000) instalment to this 
account ‘you ca:nt do anything in [seven weeks ti:me’ which justifies the 
reasonableness of this. Again we can see that the trajectory of the ongoing sequence 
is successfully shifted as Marian orients to and deals with the second TCU 
 
‘(you- you don’t)know that’ (clearly, however, Tim is not completely off 
the hook as the topic of the date of marriage is pursued further!). 
 
In sum, this section has examined speakers uses of ‘I don’t want X, I just want Y’ to 
reject some proposal regarding their actions. These proposals may be realised 
through directives or account solicitations. Research has shown that when speakers 
defy directives, directors typically respond with a second directive which upgrades the 
director’s entitlement (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, account solicitors may 
upgrade their challenge in third position (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). The use of a two 
part structure in which speakers first reject the preceding turn and then proceed to 
formulate an alternative sense of agency shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence 
and decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third-turn position. 
 
3.2 Refuting a formulation of actions or motivations 
 
 
This section focuses on the use of the two-part structure by speaker B to refute a 
formulation of their actions or intentions, as in extract seven ‘you’re not 
starting a fi:ght now are you Jane.’ When the structure is deployed in 
this environment speakers first deny the complained-of action and then proceed to 
formulate an alternative, restricted sense of agency. The inclusion of the minimiser 
‘just’ is a key response feature of these sequences (as in ‘I just want my 
clo:thes ba:ck’) as this implies that speakers motivations are restricted, 
denying that they intend to do anything more. 
Consider extract seven. The topic of talk between Jane and her daughter Emily is 
a missing jumper belonging to Jane that Emily has allegedly been seen wearing. 
Prior to the beginning of the extract Emily has repeatedly denied this. 
 
Extract 7 2008E6 12:48 
 
 
01 Emi: it’s not your jumpe:r  
02  (1.0)  
03 Jan: cause my jumper’s gone 
04  missing and you::’re seen wearing one that 
05  looks exactly like my jumper  
06 Sim: ((putting papers away in the dining 
07  room))  
08 (1) Sim: you’re not starting a fi:ght now are you Jane 
 
9 Jan:   ((walks into dining room towards Simon))  
 
 
10 (2a) Jan:   I’m not tryna’ start a fi:ght  
 
 
11 (2b) I just want my clo:thes   ba:ck. 
 
 
12 Sim:   what’s happened no:w  
 
 
13 Jan:   ((hold arm out, pointing towards living room))  
 
 
14 Jan:   well there’s pictures of he:r on facebook,  
 
 
15 wearing all my clo:thes! 
 
 
16 | (1.5) | 
17 Sim:   |((folds up plastic bag))|  
 
 
18 Sim:   °how do you kno:w°  
 
 
19  (.)  
20 Sim: well- whu- d’you don’t wanna go there now do 
21  you  
22 Jan: [((leans on chair and pushes it further under 
21  the table)) ] 
22 Jan: [whe:n do I go there then ] 
 
As the extract begins Jane proclaims emphatically ‘ 
 
cause my jumper’s gone missing and you::’re seen wearing one 
 
that looks exactly like my jumper’. At this Simon, who is in the next room, 
 
accuses Jane of ‘starting a fi:ght’. There are several design features of 
Simon’s turn at line 7 which evidence the turn’s challenging status. First, as a 
negative interrogative, Jane is heavily held accountable as the turn can be heard as 
assertive rather than questioning (Heritage, 2002). Second, the choice of lexical 
description constructs Jane’s actions as antagonistic (‘fi:ght’) as well as 
intentional, unprovoked and unjustified (‘starting’). Finally, as well as specifying 
Jane, rather than Emily as the recipient, the turn terminal address term works to 
underscore Jane as the antagonist as well as personal concern for the problem 
(Lerner, 2003). In sum, the turn can be heard as accusatory as Simon formulates 
Jane’s actions as intentionally starting a fight. To deny this accusation Jane deploys 
an ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ structure (lines 10-11). First she delivers a typical ‘didn’t 
do it’ denial. Research has shown that when speakers simply deny a complained-of 
action, co-interactants respond with a further assertion of the complained-of action 
(Dersley & Wootton, 2000). Thus leaving it at this would leave the turn susceptible 
to challenge. The likelihood of this challenge is decreased as Jane formulates an 
alternative motivation which contrasts with ‘starting a fi:ght’ which is ‘I 
just want my clo:thes ba:ck.’. Here the minimiser ‘just’ is a key 
component, highlighting that Jane’s intentions are restricted to obtaining her 
clothes and do not include ‘starting a fi:ght’. Note that the choice of noun, 
‘clo:thes’ deletes the specific relevance of the jumper and in generalising 
constructs this as a matter of principle rather than an isolated, specific, battle. As 
someone whose ‘clothes’ have been taken by another, Jane’s requests for them 
back are hardly compatible with the intentional, unjustified act of ‘starting a 
fi:ght’. We can also note that as the denial is delivered in the first TCU, a 
response to this is less immediately relevant. Jane could conceivably have built the 
turn as ‘I just want my clothes back, I’m not trying to start a fight’, which would 
make a response to her denial immediately relevant. Notably, none of the two-part 
structures in the data corpus are built in this manner. 
 
Consider another example, which is extract eight. Here the topic of talk is an 
upcoming party for Jane’s fortieth birthday which falls on the same weekend as 
Mother’s Day. Earlier in the day Emily, Jane’s daughter, announced that she will 
be working all weekend and will be unable to spend time with the family. Prior to 
the beginning of the extract Jane has announced that she is getting ‘fed up of the 
whole weekend’. 
 
Extract 8 2008E1 31:50 
 
 
01 Jan:   [((gestures with hands)) ] 
02 Jan: [what have you a:sked people to bring] 
03  (0.4)  
04 Sim: they could bringi:ng, (0.2) wh(h)y are you 
05  £worried about it£  
06  (0.4)  
07 Jan: [((gestures with hands)) ] 
08 Jan: [well c’z I’m just wondering what foo:d you’re 
09  gonna do ] 
10  (.)  
11 (1) Sim: :n’t worry abou:t it  
12 (2a) Jan: I’m not worried about it  
13 (2b)  I just* want* to know what it IS. 
14  (0.5)  
15 Sim: [((shakes head slightly)) ] 
16 Sim: [ what are you worried about¿]  
17  (0.2)  
18 Sim: >>whuh-uh<< I’m not gonna poison anybody don’t 
19  worry,  
 
In this example Jane uses the two-part structure to undermine and reject Simon’s 
 
ascription of her as ‘£worried’. In his turn at lines 4-5 Simon treats Jane’s ‘wh’ 
interrogative, regarding the food which will be at the party (line 2), as a challenge 
(Koshik, 2005). He begins to provide a relevant response (‘they could 
 
bringi:ng,’) and then abandons this in favour of soliciting an account using a 
‘why’ formatted interrogative, challenging the grounds for her enquiry. Jane’s 
subsequent reformulation of her enquiries as a normative action (‘I’m just 
wondering what foo:d you’re gonna do’), again minimised with ‘just’, is 
rejected as Simon persists with his formulation of Jane as ‘worried’ as he instructs 
her to desist in doing so (‘ :n’t worry abou:t it ’). Jane’s deployment of the 
target turn ‘I’m not worried about it I just* want* to know what 
 
it IS.’ counters and rejects the notion that she is ‘worried. As a ‘didn’t do it’ 
denial (Dersley & Wootton, 2000) the first TCU is itself is open to challenge. This 
challenge is headed off in 2b as Jane formulates an alternative motivation- that 
she just wants to know what it (the food) is. Wanting to know what food will be 
provided at her upcoming milestone birthday party does not equate to ‘worrying’. It 
is notable that this is the third revised question regarding the party food. The ‘I 
want’ format embodies high entitlement and strongly projects a relevant response 
which further decreases the likelihood of a further accusation. 
 
In the previous two excerpts, the two-part structure was built using the verb ‘want’. 
In the next case, taken from the Potts corpus, Judy first rejects Don’s formulation 
of her actions and proceeds to formulate an alternative using the verb ‘interested’. 
This eloquently shows the rhetorical work done by the selection of a particular 
mental state term. 
 
Extract 9 Potts 6 11:00 
 
 
01 Jud:   David an Tommy, 
02 Way: |((continues chewing))| 
03  | (3.0) | 
04 Jud: °and whose the sixth one° 
05 Way: |((looks at Judy))| 
06  | (2.4) | 
07 Don: would you li:v the lad alo:ne to eat his 
08  (.) [ b]loody tea, (([c]ough)) 
 
9 Way:   [  
 
 
10 Way:   [((scratches face, looks at Judy))]  
 
 
11 Don:   >spedda gi<- instead giving him the bloody  
 
 
12  (0.7) Spanish inquisition¿  
13 Jud: [((looks at Don)) ] 
14 Jud: [ making conversa:tion. 
15 Way: not allo:wed  
16  conver[sation about [someone els]e’s] 
17  children  
18 Way:  [((glances at camera))] 
19 (1) Don:  [yeah but yer juss spyi:ng on him] 
20 (2) Jud:  :t spying I’m just interested who 
21  he’s ou- who he’s bin ou:t with.  
22 (1.2) 
23 Jam:   Bob Marley. 
24 (1.6) 
 
25 Jud:   say nowt then,  
 
 
26 Don:   has he got his wai:lers the:re  
 
 
The topic of talk immediately preceding the extract is what Wayne has been doing, 
and with whom, while he was away from the house. We can begin by noting that 
the sequence contains a series of formulations and reformulations of Judy’s 
actions. At lines 7-8 Don accuses Judy of preventing Wayne from being able to eat 
his ‘tea’ (a term used to denote an evening meal), implying that her questions 
concerning with whom he has been spending time are illegitimate and overbearing. 
He then formulates her questions as ‘giving him the bloody (0.7) 
Spanish inquisition¿’. This idiomatic expression highlights the extreme and 
complainable nature of Judy’s actions while moving to close the topic (Drew & 
Holt, 1988). At line 14 Judy emphatically rejects Don’s implied accusation that her 
questioning is illegitimate by delivering a ‘didn’t do it’ denial (Dersley & Wootton, 
2000). Notably this is delegitimized by Wayne as he invokes the presence of the 
recording equipment as a basis for not talking about ‘someone else’s 
children’ (i.e. with whom Wayne has been spending time). Judy’s denial is also 
emphatically rejected by Don as he cuts into Wayne’s turn with a further 
accusation ‘yeah but yer juss spyi:ng on him’. 
 
In the target turn Judy first denies this accusation ‘ :t spying ’ and 
 
proceeds to reformulate her actions ‘I’m just interested who he’s ou- 
who he’s bin ou:t with. ’. The second TCU removes the problematic, specific 
characterization of what kind of conversation is taking place as Judy invokes her 
intentional states and reformulates her enquiries as a normative action. There are two 
things to note about this sequence. First, following a second assertion of the 
complained-of action by Don, Judy heads off further pursuit by formulating an 
intentional state ‘interested’. In this instance this is successful as following a lapse in 
the conversation (line 25) Jamie offers an ironic candidate answer ‘Bob Marley.’ 
which is further developed by Don (‘has he got his wai:lers the:re’). A 
second observation is Judy’s careful characterization of her actions as she formulates 
the object of her ‘interest’ as a way of managing an interactional dispute regarding 
motivation. Note the self repair at lines 20-21, as the projected ‘who he’s out with’ 
which would suggest an ongoing, perhaps overbearing and illegitimate interest, is 
replaced with ‘who he’s bin ou:t with. ’, specifying that her interest applies in 
this instance only. Also note that the choice of lexical description ‘interested’ is 
devoid of any notion of monitoring or ‘spying’. ‘Wanting’ to know something invokes 
personal investment and a perhaps illegitimate interest, which is precisely the type of 
interest which the turn is working to refute. In contrast the term ‘interested’ is devoid of 
any notion of spying and orients to the topic of conversation, with whom Wayne has 
been spending time, as Wayne’s business. While being ‘interested’ in what one’s child 
has been up to is a legitimate action for a mother to be doing, ‘wanting’ to know and 
having a personal investment in doing so, may not be. We can see then that the 
choice of lexical description, Judy’s formulation of her actions as ‘interested’ is 
sequentially specific and is a practical expression which is delivered within a 
sequential flow of interactional considerations. 
In sum, in this section the analysis has shown how, following a formulation of their 
actions, speakers may respond by first delivering a ‘didn’t do it denial’ and then 
proceeding to formulate an alternative sense of agency. The interactional import of 
the ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ structure in this environment is to decrease the 
likelihood of accusers responding with a further assertion of the complained-of 
action in third-turn position. 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper has identified a two-part structure in which speakers invoke intentions 
and motivation as they formulate their ‘wants’ and identified two environments 
where this structure is recurrently deployed. The first of these is to a reject 
proposal made by speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. The second is to 
undermine and refute a formulation of speaker B’s actions made by speaker A. 
 
 
This paper extends our understanding of sequences in which some aspect of 
another’s conduct is specified as I began by examining speakers’ uses of the device 
to reject a proposal regarding their actions. These proposals may be realised via 
directives, which are the prototypical action for directing another’s actions, and 
account solicitations. Typically when recipients refuse to comply with directives, 
directors respond by delivering a second directive which upgrades the director’s 
entitlement to deliver the directive and reduces the contingencies relevant to the 
recipient’s compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, in third-turn position 
account solicitors may upgrade their challenging stance towards the accountable item 
(Bolden & Robinson 2011). Speakers may conceivably respond by delivering 
the first TCU only. However doing so would leave these turns open to challenge. The 
use of a two-part structure in which speakers first reject the directive or proposal and 
then proceed to formulate an alternative, contrasting intention works to decrease the 
likelihood of further challenge. This is realised in two ways. First, when responding to 
multiunit turns, speakers normatively respond to the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007). 
 
Delivering a rejection in the first TCU decreases the likelihood of further challenge. 
Second, the formulation of an alternative sense of agency highlights that rather than 
carry out the proposed action, speakers are motivated to do some other thing. 
 
 
In the second part of the analysis I examined speakers uses of the structure to reject a 
formulation of their motivations delivered in the preceding turn. This extends our 
understanding of complaint sequences by examining one practice for responding to a 
compliant implicative accusation. My analysis shows that complaint recipients may 
decrease the likelihood of further challenge in third turn position by first rejecting the 
formulation and proceeding to formulate an alternative motivation in the second TCU. 
Two features of ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ constructions work in combination to head off 
a potential further challenge. First, speakers formulate an alternative sense of agency 
which implies that as speakers are motivated to do one thing, they are not motivated 
to do anything more. Second, the formulation of an alternative sense of agency in the 
second TCU following a rejection decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in 
third turn position. 
 
 
Let us now consider the broader issue of the concept of intentional action based on 
agents’ beliefs and desires. Intentional states are widely considered to be a priori 
cognitive entities that are expressed through communication and which can be used 
to predict and explain behaviour. Within the field of social cognition intentions are 
understood as a function of an individual’s beliefs and desires. That is, beliefs and 
desires are understood as pre-existing variables which may be used to explain an 
individual’s behaviour. My analysis of speakers’ formulations of their ‘wants’ as 
sequentially specific phenomena makes problematic the notion of the communication 
of pre-existing desires. Thus, rather than descriptions of pre-existing inner 
experiences, the ‘I want’ constructions examined here are best understood as 
formulations that are rhetorically organised to undermine and reject an alternative that 
is alive in the current interaction. With regards to the questions posed within Social 
Cognition and Developmental Psychology, rather than ‘a referential challenge’ 
(Slaughter, et al., 2009: 1058) as the child faces the impossible problem of describing 
‘internal, unobservable mental states’ (ibid.) the child’s task may be best understood 
as determining the appropriate uses of terms in interaction. 
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